Photo of TBF/M Avengers: kindly provided by the Naval Air Station Museum Fort Lauderdale Florida.
( Part 1.)”IN CONTEXT” CAUSALITY IN 1945
Perhaps the hardest question to answer in trying to make any case for a Flight-19 conspiracy theory is why?
What could possibly cause the United States Government, or in this case the United States Navy to feel the need to cover up or suppress the details surrounding not only the disappearance but perhaps the discovery and recovery of the five TBM Avenger aircraft?
At first glance, it seems like a pretty farfetched idea: trying to associate the deaths of 14 sailors and marines in a training accident with any part of a conspiracy theory, especially with little evidence in a period just after the victorious end of World War II, right?
Of course, it’s not as incredible as saying that the planes were snatched up by aliens. Still, questions exist and will probably continue too as long as there’s still a Bermuda Triangle or at least until the wrecks and remains are definitively identified and possibly until they are recovered.
Just to be clear, as of this moment and as far as this author is aware, there has yet to be any direct or empirically documented evidence of a cover-up of any kind surrounding Flight-19.
For argument’s sake, however, given what we know today regarding government and military ethics, and the concept of plausible deniability, it’s not out of the realm of possibility.
So, if we take the idea of duplicity seriously, we need to ask in what context would we need to examine the backdrop of the event to make a case for conspiracy? What was going on at the time that may have affected, or quite possibly been affected by the missing training flight in such a way that it would need to be hidden?
One thing we can be sure of is the fact that profound change and adjustments were a constant factor in the US military-industrial complex in the period between the end of World War II and the beginning of the cold war in 1947.
With the invention of the atomic bomb and the US becoming the first nuclear superpower many of the larger-scale transitions both internal and external substantially impacted the Navy.
Furthermore: there is enough circumstantial evidence around some of the most prominent changes to conclude the Navy was overburdened, and its resources taxed to the point that there can be no denying it was complicit if not also negligent in the Flight-19 tragedy. A detailed look at the following contributing factors will appear in future posts.
They are:
Major Changes in the Navy’s leadership caused upheaval and chaos as the wishes and directions of the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) and Secretary of the Navy changed in a relatively short period of time impacting both short and long-term service needs.
Demobilization – the general recall of the majority of US Forces back to civilian life initially found the Navy lacking a stable platform from which to base fair decisions for an equitable form of service-related discharge program for its own personnel.
Operation “Magic Carpet” put additional strain on the Navy requiring it to transport large volumes of service personnel back to the CONUS quickly, so quickly that combat vessels quite often filled in as transports.
Navy Manning tables especially those related to occupation duties were uncharacteristically altered consistently straining the system in place, forcing unusual and potentially dangerous adjustments to personnel losses while also trying to prioritize the new peacekeeping and occupation missions.
Though conclusive evidence is yet to be found, and Navy & Marine Corps dissertation rates had averaged around 5.5 per 1,000 throughout the war, odds are as demobilization faltered those numbers spiked as 1945 came to a close, further causing shortages of staff and crews.
Naval doctrine was at a critical junction at the end of the war as Battleship domination in sea warfare was over, replaced by the still-forming future concept of naval air forces centered around aircraft carrier battle groups.
The Army Air Corps was pushing for strategic dominance over the Navy in ownership and use of the new ‘Atomic Bomb’, while in the process creating a separate branch of service from the Army purposefully designed for the new mission: The soon-to-be US Air Force.
The War Department, aka the US Army, using the bomb as a stepping-off point was inwardly working to disband and absorb the US Marine Corps, and in passing, marginalize the US Navy and its role in national defense through the planned military unification began under FDR.
Concurrent with the loss of Flight-19 the results of the USS Indianapolis sinking and the court-martial of Captain Charles B. McVay III brought about a closer examination of Navy procedures and questioned its ability to command, communicate and control effectively before and during the drawdown.
In conclusion: to say the least these pre-cold war events and mindsets created a chaotic period of adjustment for the military, potentially impacting national security.
Influenced by political gamesmanship, public perceptions, and the resulting pressure on, and by Congress, this confusion and disorganization would carry over to all facets of the Navy.
Furthermore, the perception of fallibility would influence navy operational, training and maintenance procedures, and outcomes, including those of the Advanced Naval Air Training Command to the point, that it impacted installations on the Southeast Coast specifically in this case NAS Fort Lauderdale.
This hit to naval prestige would aid the Navy’s detractors and help to weaken its public standing and threaten its very existence. The need for containment and fidelity of the exposure of the Flight-19 incident therefore would seem great if not imperative. But is it reason enough to explain a potential cover-up?
November 26, 2017 – In his book “The Discovery of Flight-19”, Jon Myhre details the wreckage of a naval aircraft from the 1940’s or 50’s found in the woods near the everglades in Felsmere Florida sometime in the 1960’s or 70’s.
The only evidence of this wreck which I know to still exist are items removed from the scene by one of the persons who found the plane, Judge Graham Stikelether of Indian River County, FL. A .50 Caliber Machine Gun with a bent barrel, a .50 caliber machine gun mount of some kind, and one or two other various un-identified parts, are all that is left.
Destroyed .50- Caliber machine gun found at the Felsmers Florida wreck in the 1960/70’s.
Now, despite there being dozens if not hundreds of missing Navy and Army aircraft from the mid -twentieth century in the waters in and around parts of Florida, this particular wreck is of great interest for a few different reasons. We’ll focus on just one here.
This specific plane crash site stands out, first and foremost because it was found inland, and not on the ocean floor!!
Of course, the idea of some of the missing Flight-19 planes crashing over land is a relatively new one, but it holds more merit, than saying they all were sucked up into some kind of vortex over the Bermuda Triangle, and it is much easier to investigate than scanning the sea bottom for metal wrecks. Still it has its challenges.
After 72 years, records have been lost, destroyed, or worse yet redacted, metal rusts, and memories fade away. But as Jon explains in his 2012 book by the Paragon Agency (ISBN13: 978-1-891030-58-1) if it turns out the wreckage found in Felsmere was that of a TBM-1C Avenger after all, it could very well be that of FT-36 Bul No. 73209. The plane was piloted by Captain Edward Joseph, Powers Jr. USMC, 09789, and crewed by Staff Sergeant, Howell Orrin,Thompson, USMCR, 499181 & Staff Sergeant,George Richard, Paonessa , USMC, 805639.
Can you identify this machine gun mount?
So how can we determine the aircraft identity? Well, one way is through part identification via serial no. plates and records if possible.
Jon had figured out long before I had, that we might be able to pin point the type of aircraft this machine gun came from if we could track the serial no. from production to delivery.
Unfortunately, there are thousands if not hundreds of thousands of Browning .30 & .50 caliber machine guns out there. Furthermore; over time the patent to produce them has been sold to dozens of manufacturers around the world. The best I have done so far has been to pretty much duplicate Jon’s research. The gun as indicated on the plate shown, was made in New Haven Connecticut by the High Standard Company under the Browning moniker.
ID Serial No. Plate for .50 caliber machine gun. (All Photos courtesy of Jon Myhre.)
I’ve contacted Browning but as they don’t own the military portion of the company anymore the best they could do was forward my request to a history docent at the Browning Museum. So far that lead hasn’t panned out either and though I haven’t given up and am working on the High Standard connections again as Jon had I don’t expect to make much headway.
However: I believe the key to the identification of the type of aircraft could be narrowed down by identifying the machine gun mount itself. First of all, the question is whether it’s a turret mount or a wing mount.? If it is an AN-M2 aerial machine gun, which I can’t tell from the plate, is it likely a wing mount gun?
The Avenger had a specially mounted gun in a purposely built turret placed to the rear of the pilot. The TBM-1 like other planes of the period had two .50 calibers in the wing root for strafing. If the gun mount photo could be matched to that of an Avenger turret part we would have our answer. If it turns out to be a wing based gun we’ve gotten no where. It wouldn’t even help determining if it was an Army or Navy plane. So far photos I have seen of the turret have not shed any light.
My next stop in this part of the investigation is to visit the the Springfield Armory Museum right here in Springfield. Perhaps, I may be able to learn more about the gun there. If you have any information that may be helpful please feel free to contact me at fivesides2@yahoo.com.
Did the Navy Intentionally Create a ‘Willful Blindness’ in the case of flight-19?
US Pentagon (C.1945)-Public Domain
Nineteen Forty-Five was a particularly turbulent year in American History. Not only was it the end of the largest and most costly war in history, but it also marked the beginning of a series of events destined to impact and change the US Military stratagem, and the course of the Navy’s role in national defense forever.
Technological gains in aviation were making it hard for the US Navy to justify the funding of a large Battleship-centrist fleet, especially in light of the dropping of the atomic bomb by the Army Air Corps late in the war.
Furthermore: the discussions between the War Department and the Department of the Navy on the concept of military unification begun by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a staunch Navy supporter, under the War Powers Act of 1941, and propagated by his successor President Harry Truman, a stubborn Army advocate, were turning problematic for the naval services.
In the face of demobilization, drastic fleet reductions and reorganization, logistic stresses, and reduced manning tables, and with the military unification discussions leaning heavily in favor of the Army, the Navy faced the possibility of not only becoming inadequate but marginalized relative to any future national defense strategies.
In addition, the Marine Corps, which had been faced with outright elimination several times in its history, was once again confronted with the possibility of total redundancy if not liquidation simply because of the precepts of what would turn out to be a false security created by atomic weapons.
To Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal’s chagrin, the influence of the Navy in government spheres was waning at a time when it could ill afford it. Its recent hegemony was being threatened as the old political biases and rivalries between the Army and Navy were once again poking their heads causing animosity and vitriol between the branches.
“Simultaneously with the Atomic Bomb as a weapon of immense strategic power the new age of American influence was threatened internally by the imbalance of equity between the branches of service over air power especially as it pertained to strategic air power and that of the bomb specifically.” – James Forrestal Diaries
This perceived loss of prominence, and shift in influence from the Navy in favor of the Army, and the additional competition for succor by the National Military Establishment, and the Navy’s need to retain an independent tactical if not strategic air force is what I believe to be the reason behind any Flight-19 conspiracy. The National Security Act of 1947 established a reorganization and reallocation of resources that was seen by many in the naval chain of command as a shift in the roles and missions of both the Navy and Marine Corps.
Contextually speaking, any loss of prestige by the Navy especially any failures specifically revolving around naval aviation, meant that it would not only be bargaining from a weaker political position in military unification talks such as those at the Key West Agreements of 1948, but in late 1945 the mere suggestion of an inept naval air training system must have been seen by the navy as another reason, another threat, to the argument for a carrier based fleet.
Unfortunately, only weeks before December 5th, the Navy had found itself forced to deal with the tragic loss of the USS Indianapolis on July 30th, 1945. The resulting court-martial of its captain, demanded by Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations aided in damaging its reputation in the eyes of not only the public but perhaps more importantly, in Congress.
Furthermore, downplayed by V-J Day and once again the dropping of the atomic bomb the terrible loss of life was evidently and perhaps with concealment in mind moved to the back or bottom page of the newspapers almost obscuring it from the public eye.
CONDUCT UNBECOMING
What was naturally considered by many a monumental failure of command by the ship Captain – a concept perpetuated by naval traditions and lore – leading to the death of hundreds of sailors and marines in the sinking of the ‘Indy‘, turned out to not only be a case of scapegoating of the captain, but a smokescreen of the larger issue of incompetant and possibly criminal negligence of the navy as a whole, or at least in the Pacific Theater of operations.
Then to have six training aircraft inexplicably go missing off the coast of Florida, on December 5th overlapping the tail end of the scandalous and nationally captivating court martial of Captain Charles B. McVay III (December 3rd-19th. 1945), must have certainly been disconcerting to the naval chain of command, to say the least.
Not to mention, the curious timing and speed of the first naval investigation of the Flight-19 disappearance, just five days into the search and rescue operations, and its conclusion on the 3rd of January 1946 suggests a possible malfeasance of its own.
BOARD VS COURT OF INQUIRY
It took weeks if not months for the board of investigation and court-martial of Captain McVay but only days for the board of inquiry into Flight-19. Why? Though the circumstances and scale of cases and the scope of the loss of life were much different, one case having actual survivors that could be questioned and the other not, the comparison of the two cannot be overlooked.
The question is if it had the desire to do so, and in the case of Flight-19, it seems it might had, what could the Navy do to mitigate the potential impact of another such deleterious investigation? Was the Official Flight-19 report buried on purpose or just lost within the myriad of paperwork that would naturally be associated with a large government organization?
With the newspaper headlines boldly announcing the additional disappearance of one of the PBM-5 Martin Mariners sent out as search and rescue of Flight-19, – just fanning the flames of the fire – is it unreasonable or unfair to assume that those in charge would not want to mitigate any further damage to naval stature, especially in the aviation community and if so create a willfull blindness feigning legitimate inquiry?
Either way, poor weather and faltering wills allowed leadership within the Naval Air Training Command as well as the 7th and, 8th Naval Districts, the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers to take action curtailing a very expansive five-day search for survivors to be followed by a quick non-publicized investigation and rush to judgment against Lt. Charles C.Taylor, the flight leader.
The Cover Page for the Official Navy Board of Investigation December 10th, 1945
In 1945 the FAA, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and Naval Investigative Services (NIS) were in their infancy. The Navy Inspector General’s Office (IG) was only a few years old and the Naval Judge Advocate General (JAG) had just recently been given a large enough presence to be made effective as an office.
Before the UCMJ, (Uniformed Code of Military Justice) came into being the “Law of the Sea”, known as Rocks and Shoals stood as president to naval law. See the Caine Mutiny for an example of the ship-board legal system.
Orders from Admiral Davison (CNAAT) to Create the 1st Board of Investigation: Note the Redactions due to the application of the Privacy Laws of 1974!
The four-man board convened by Navy Captain Albert K. Morehouse, Commanding Officer of NAS, Miami (Opa Locka), included Lieutenant Commander Richard S. (Robbie) Roberts, Operations Officer at NAS, Ft. Lauderdale, the board recorder, Commander Joseph T. Yavorsky and Commander Howard S. Roberts both pilots, were directed to their task by Admiral Ralph E. Davison Advanced Naval Air Aviation Training Command Jacksonville, Florida, just two days into the Search and Rescue efforts.
It might be interesting for the reader to note that the investigation coincidentally occurred just before the holidays, and collectively at a time just before prominent naval line officer’s retirements or promotions?
Admirals Earnest King and William D Leahy for example were at the end of their tenure and about ready to retire from the active navy and Secretary James Forrestal and Admiral Chester Nimitz along with Admiral John H.Towers a prominent naval aviator and friend of Forrestals’, were being considered for advancements into key positions that would seemingly benefit the Navy after unification.
Just how critical then was it for the Navy to present a united front and prevent the case being made by Secretary Forrestal of the need for naval aviation amid the military unification talks from being scuttled?
In Jon Myhre’s book The Discovery of Flight-19 Lieutenant Commander Richard Roberts, claimed that he personally experienced and felt the pressure and tension being placed on the board members from the admiralty, mainly by NAS Jacksonville & NAS Pensacola for the proceedings to commence and conclude quickly. No doubt, it makes sense that Admirals Wagner & Davison recognized the significance of the proceedings and they too were feeling anxiety from the pressure above.
NAVAL CHAIN OF COMMAND AT THE END OF 1945 INTO 1946
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY – JAMES FORRESTAL
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Ernest J. King (Aviator) – CNO Chester Nimitz
Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) Admiral Richard Stanislaus Edwards
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for (Air), (DCNO)Marc Andrew Mitscher – Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford,
Chief of Naval Air Training, (CNAT) – Admiral Frank.D.Wagner
Chief of Advanced Naval Air Aviation Training Command (ANAATC) Admiral Ralph E. Davison
But was the pressure so great that demonstrative and documentary evidence of several discrepancies within testimonies, some major contradictions and conflicts within the report including scrivener errors within the exhibits themselves indicates that the mishap was a case of human error, a confluence of incomplete and unverified aircraft maintenance, the weather, and faulty leadership decisions within the training system at NAS Ft. Lauderdale and the naval aviation training command itself were accidentally or even purposely overlooked?
According to Gian Quasar in his book, They Flew into Oblivion, and in my own research, one can’t help wondering why these errors were not noted and corrected or at least commented on by other reviewing agencies. They should have easily been caught had the board members or anyone reviewing the report done their due diligence.
Three Divisions (or a flight) of TBF/M’s fly by the USS Coral Sea (US Navy)
It’s almost unimaginable what the outcome of a court-martial of the Flight-19 trainer/evaluator, Lt. Charles C. Taylor would have been if the planes and crews of the ill-fated flight had survived. Two Navy and three Marine Corps aircraft and crews were lost that day, lost during what may be considered an esoteric fact; that it was not just a training exercise, but a blind navigation test! Furthermore: The Training-49 crew (Combat Air Crew 88G) the PBM-5 Martin Mariner that was one of the two search planes sent to search for the missing TBM’s were also mostly all trainees!
THE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS
Admittedly speculative but not unreasonable, based on the outcome of the McVay Court Martial, and the results of the Official Board of Investigation into the Flight-19 disappearance the charges of dereliction of duty and insubordination at minimum would likely have been considered by the members leading to some form of a trial of Lt. Taylor and perhaps others if they had survived.
And yet though there was no opportunity to do so, that is in essence what happened, as the navy in the initial investigation assailed his stature in absentia, without him being able to defend himself, and with no conclusive evidence other than records of radio transmissions and interviews of ground personnel who were responsible for different aspects of the flight before it got off the ground.
But like Captain McVay, simply because he was in charge Lt. Taylor became the patsy for the combined errors of the entire Naval air training command that day.
“The Navy has a unique tradition: to hold accountable the highest levels of leadership for any event that causes harm to sailors or U.S. national security. While McVay’s conviction was legally correct, the standard of accountability applied to him was never applied with the same rigor to anyone else, and was not, therefore, a “standard.” – US Navy Institute.
In…Opinion #44 - read as such the loss of aircraft based on the state of mind of Lt. Taylor resulting from “Temporary Confusion…faulty judgment…..” and “That no offenses have been known to be committed …other than that which may be assigned….to Lt . Charles C. Taylor.”….etc. It’s only correct that he holds some form of culpability and in the end, Admiral Davison does mildly indicate other extenuating systemic factors for Taylor’s failure but only as a means to prevent future loss through training changes.
If not for the courage and fortitude of his Mother and Aunt to clear his name, a battle engaged with Rear Admiral Ralph E. Jennings, a highly respected Naval Aviator & his aide Captain Ben Scott Custer a second investigation between 1946 and 1947 by the Navy’s Board of Corrections exonerating Taylor altogether would not have occurred.
The Board of Corrections Results – Note the Secretary of the Navy had changed.
THE THIRD INVESTIGATION or REVIEW OF THE FIRST?
If it hadn’t been for the dauntless efforts of these two women, and the initial spur to action among relatives of the crews and politicians such as Senator David I Walsh (D) of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, Congressman Milton West, (D) Texas 15th District, William Sterling Cole 37th-39th District NY (R) the story of Flight-19 might not have seen the light of day.
A possible third Investigation or perhaps a review of the first report, putatively mounted by a surely ‘ole Marine Corps general, a former Marine aviator turned Congressman Melvin J. Maas Major General USMCR/and chief investigator for the House Naval Affairs Committee in 1945/46 said to have been prompted by a petition of 54 relatives of twelve of the missing men was asked of Secretary Forrestal to provide a congressional report. However, I have yet to find evidence of such an investigation.
In the background of both of these investigations, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal was desperately seeking parity with two opposing viewpoints within the Navy itself, those for and those against military unification. He also had to deal with an almost belligerent Admiral King, and simultaneously placate the Army as well as President Truman. All the while simultaneously lobbying for the strategic and tactical authority of naval aviation and the need for both in future unification plans and national defense was very burdensome. Now add the last apple to the apple cart. Flight-19.
NATIONAL SECURITY
So one may ask, how the Navy would even begin to create a willful blindness of the events of December 5th?
Though it was 1945 and the war was over, much of the equipment being used in the TBF/M Avenger was top-of-the-line. Operational security had been a sore spot in transferring equipment over to our allies even during the war. Items such as the Norden bombsight and direction-finding and radio equipment made aircraft such as the TBM-1E (FT-36 ) itself having an updated electronic suite, the TBM-3(D?) (FT-28) had a special form of radar attached to its wing specifically for anti-submarine patrolling. Operational security prevented the use of this equipment, by anyone not cleared to.
According to Presidential Executive Order 8381, certain vital military and naval installations and equipment dated 1940, as it pertains in regards to the National Security Classification Act from January 12th, 1938 just about every operational, technical, maintenance, part, and training manual, every memo, report, and communication could be potentially classified as Restricted or Confidential if it was determined by someone with the authority to have any information that could be used by an adversary against the US.
This capability gave the War Department (US Army) and the Department of the Navy, a wide latitude in defining what constitutes a threat to national security.
Because of National Security, the Official Flight-19 Naval Proceedings report of 1946 was at least in part classified as RESTRICTED and, was placed in cabinets, vaults, and archives throughout the Navy Department until it was moved along with other declassified documents sometime in the 1970’s and given to the National Archives, long after the National Security Act of 1947.
Today Flight-19 is still a sore spot on the Navy’s reputation and there is still rancor among the military establishment over unification. It is very likely that the risk of opening old wounds, the drain on money and time, potential lawsuits over jurisdictional differences as well as privacy concerns especially as it pertains to something as undefinable and embarrassing as losing aircraft in “the Bermuda Triangle” are what keep the Navy from willfully pursuing this issue any further. Though it cannot be conclusively proven at this time, the Navy likely buried the paperwork hoping it would never see the light of day again.
Admiral John H. Towers the struggle for naval air supremacy by Clark G. Reynolds NIP 1991
The Disappearance of Flight-19, by Larry Kusche Harpercollins; 1980 ISBN 978-0-0601-2477-9
The Discovery of Flight-19: A 30 year search for the lost patrol in the Bermuda Triangle, by Jon F. Myhre, 2012 Paragon Agency Publishers Orange CA
The Forrestal Diaries Edited by Walter Millis with the Collaboration of E S Duffield, The Viking Press, New York October 1951, Copyright New York Herald Tribune 1951.
Indianapolis by Lynn Vincent and Sara Vladic, Simon & Schuster NY 2018, ISBN 978-1-5011-3594-1
In Harms Way: The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis and the Extraordinary Story of Its Survivors by Doug Stanton, Henry Holt and Company; 2001 ISBN 978-1-5673-1797-8
After a bit of a hiatus from my book research, I decided to make a follow-up trip down to the New England Air Museum (NEAM) in Windsor Locks Connecticut. Ever since my last visit to the museum with the grandkids a few years back I had been meaning to return for research purposes, and I just recently found the perfect opportunity to do just that.
Because I am both a veteran and a father, I decided to take advantage of the Open Cockpit event on the weekend of Father’s Day 2023. My intention was to get into the storage hanger where the museum’s TBM-3E Avenger is reportedly kept in an effort to identify and determine the provenance of the specific machine gun that was the focus of my post from 2017. My interest in the visit peaked as I was led to believe by a kindly volunteer over the phone the day before, that open access to the storage hangers wouldn’t be a problem.
Up to this point using *Avenger Walk Arounds’ or even the TBF/M-3 Pilot Manual **AN 01-190EB-2 had been frustrating giving me few advantages in matching specific parts and offering me no clues as to determining the specific origination of the gun on the plane, let alone how to identify it.
As you might remember my goal was to see if I could finally put to bed my theory that the .50 Caliber machine gun found in the Avenger wreck, by then future Judge Graham Stikelether in 1964 outside of Felsmere Florida: possibly a gun from ***FT-36, was from the plane’s turret and not one of the two wings. Earlier on, in my first post I had hoped to be able to trace the serial number from the gun and match it up to a specific plane, but my efforts turned out to be futile as there were tens of thousands of .50 calibers produced before and after World War II and I could find no record listings for the High Standard Manufacturing Company New Haven CT.
My overarching objective however was to simply identify the plane as a TBF/M and since it was the only naval aircraft of the period known to have a turret, if I could at least show that the gun came from the turret, the case making the connection to Flight-19 could be made just that much easier.
Grumman 150SE-2 Turret – New England Air Museum
The desire to prove my theory had been recently reignited after watching the Tv show History’s Greatest Mysteries produced by Lone Wolf Media for the History Channel. Of all the shows I’ve seen on the subject of Flight-19, it comes the closest in its scientific process to fairly addressing not only the traditional questions but also some of the lesser-known aspects of the story as well.
If you haven’t seen the episode, I highly recommend it. To my surprise Season 2 Episode 1 Expedition Bermuda Triangle which primarily centered on the Flight-19 mystery had also featured the very same machine gun I have been trying to trace.
Halfway through the show, the two historians David O’Keefe & Wayne Abbott introduce us to Graham Stilkether Jr. the son of Judge Stilkether. Funnily enough both men had seemingly also tried tracing the gun’s serial number only to end with the same conclusion and at approximately the same time I had.
Graham Jr; who was very interested in displaying the machine gun and telling the story of how his father came by it, surprisingly doesn’t mention or refer to any other parts that may have been found by the Judge that day, only the machine gun itself. Whether that was a matter of editing by the show or not is unclear. Unfortunately, my communications with Mr. Stilkether were limited and unfruitful, so I was unable to interview him personally. To my knowledge, it was not the only item found.
Note the bent .50 caliber AN-M2 (photo provided by Jon Myhre) above and the Electric Turret Control MK 3-1 (#2) left and the machine gun collar right. Now compare both to the wing and landing gear/wing fold strut trunnion mounts in the lower frame.
The images previously sent to me by my late friend Jon Myhre, a Flight-19 expert showed the bent barreled gun and included photos of what appeared to be some sort of collar or gun mount and a serial number as well. I assumed that everything came off the gun itself. It was these assumptions and lack of clarity in the story that is the reason why my re-evaluation of the NEAM museum’s Grumman 150SE-2 turret was so important.
Needless to say, I was disappointed to learn at the main desk that access to the Avenger was unavailable. However: knowing how communications in large organizations with volunteer’s work, I was not totally caught unprepared, and I had a plan B of sorts set up just in case.
I decided I would look at any .50 caliber machine gun I could find to make comparisons with. After all, seeing is believing, and the first display to catch my eye was the B-25G series Mitchell Army Air Corps Bomber “Dog Daize’s “.
It’s four .50’s and 75mm howitzer sticking out the nose reminded me of a World War II version of the A-10 warthog. With its lethal punch mostly all upfront, the way the plane was used made it more of an attack aircraft than a bomber.
The waist-mounted guns in particular were of particular interest as they seemed to be in some kind of sled-like harness leading to a “H” pintle mount. Though the harnesses seemed to possibly be replicas, in my mind these K series .50 caliber mounts resembled what I remembered of the TBF/M Avenger turret gun support.
The K-7 or K series gun mount found on B-17’s, 24’s and 25’s bomber aircraft of the period.
It was at this point that I realized my focus needed to shift from tracking the serial number to identifying the supposed mount. To make the final determination about the gun positioning I needed to positively identify the part and its location in the aircraft.
Sled like Mark 8-1-gun adapter mount for the 150SE-2 Turret.
As I exited the rear door of the main hangar, I curiously scoped two open storage hangars in the bright daylight, and I went looking for an Avenger. I was hoping that maybe the desk had made a mistake? To my chagrin they were accurate. It was evidently in a third storage hangar farther back.
So, after almost giving up all hope of making my determination due to a lack of physical and empirical evidence, I approached a group of volunteers who were operating a very rare engine display from a pre-World War 2 Navy D-6 Blimp for the crowds. After explaining my situation and what I was looking for; the opportunity to view a similar AN-M2 wing-mounted gun from the era, preferably on a naval aircraft, one of the docents “James” enthusiastically offered his assistance with an idea for a parallel comparison.
I guess, it turns out It helps to ask the right questions of the right people because he knew of an F6F Bearcat and It was on display and accessible to the public. The Bearcat a Navy fighter aircraft that had been introduced later in the war flew alongside Avengers off the deck of aircraft carriers and also had wing mounted AN-M2’s.
Between shows, I managed to wrangle James into leading me to the plane. Though it was quite an effort to get back behind the aircraft, as it was tucked away tightly in one of the main hanger corners, I managed to get far enough and high enough to view the folded wing, with his assistance I was able to obtain a close-up video. There was just enough lighting to determine that the mount from the Avenger was more similar to that of a wing mount and not the turret. Upon closer inspection, the mount really didn’t look like the part I had seen. I began to question whether it was a mount or even anything associated with a machine gun at all?
James also returned with me to the 150SE-2 turret that I had been intently examining in my last visit to help me verify that its gun did not have a traditional “H” bracket mount but instead more of a sled style brace similar to that of the B-25 waist mount. What turned out to be a Mark 8-1-gun adapter connected to the power unit in the Avenger turret provided the elevation and traverse that would have been manually operated in the waist gunners position in the B-25G/J.
Is this a Machine Gun trunnion Bolt MK-1 or something else?
On my way out of the museum, I continued to look at other displays searching for any kind of information I could use to help my argument and discovered an Army Air Corps P-47. If you’ve ever wondered what the AN in AN-M2 stood for its Army/Navy and as in the Navy, the Army used the M2 or MA Deuce in its fighter aircraft as well. The Thunderbolt on display had a walled backdrop featuring photographs and stories from the pilot and ground crew. One section included the weaponry and loadout for the wing-mounted guns. The photographs showed the stacked mounts of three guns aligned similar to that I found in the Bearcat.
The Machine Gun set up from the F6F in the upper left and lower right compared to the P-47 photograph. Notice the machine gun collar circled and the mount for the F6F circled below. The question is, were there other parts found with the Stilkether gun and if so what part of the aircraft did they belong to?
Note the location of – The Electric Trigger Control MK 3-1 (#2) Trunnion Bolt MK-1 (#16)
Besides the image of the MG trunnion bolt MK-1 located on page 510 of the TBM-3 Pilots manual the mount in question might also be from the undercarriage of the aircraft as indicated in the second photo in this post. It just might be part of the wing or landing gear but as of yet I have not pinpointed it.
Though I am getting closer to a final determination regarding the gun, to this point I have made no definite identification or conclusion. However, based not on the “mount” but on the trigger drive on the side of the gun receiver which according to the manuals indicates that the gun was electrically operated on its starboard (right) side it more than likely came out of a starboard side wing root mount. The gun was not from the turret after all.
No such picture that I know of exists showing the turret gun with this feature. Futhermore: the “mount” that is indicated in the photo above appears in actuality to likely be a collar for a piston associated with the fold in the wing just outside the wing machine gun location or as part of the landing gear construction.
Perhaps my final analysis will come with a visit to the American Heritage Museum outside of Hudson MA. They too have a TBF/M in their collection as well, and with any luck, I can get access to it on my next visit there someday soon.
*Avenger Walk Arounds #25 & D&S Vol 53 From Squadron Publications
**AN 01-190EB-2 TBM-3 Pilots Manual US Navy
***FT-36 Bul No. 73209 had been allegedly pulled from the Everglades by the US Navy with two crew remains still aboard. The plane piloted by Captain Edward Joseph, Powers Jr. USMC, 09789, was crewed by Staff Sergeant, Howell Orrin, Thompson, USMCR, 499181 & Staff Sergeant, George Richard, Paonessa , USMC, 805639.
Copy of Chart of OP-31-jab Serial: 177P03 from the First Naval District Port Directors Files 22 October 1945 – NARA College Park Maryland
According to the 1st Naval District Port Director Files; the fleet diagram (shown above) indicates that the US Atlantic Fleet as of 10/17/1945 was technically the parent organizational force for the much of the entire Navy at that time to includ the Second,Fourth,Eighth and Tenth active fleets. Keep in mind this was at least two months after the surrender of the Japanese on V-J Day.
Looking more closely though, the chart also indicates how much of a role the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) still had in the operational control of a large portion of the Navy, to include the Eastern, Gulf and Caribeean Sea Frontiers as well as the Sixteenth (Inactive) Fleet; all control entities for the units involved in the Flight-19 training and search and rescue missions.
The Chief of Naval Operations at that time and up to the day he was relieved of command December 15th, 1945 was Fleet Admiral Ernest King. Coincidentally his tour of duty ended just four days prior to the Court Martial of Captain James McVay of the USS Indianapolis was completed and just five days after the search and rescue of Flight-19 ended.
Cardinal FLIGHT-19 Research Resources (Pg.2) Updated 2/23/2022
A US Navy Sailor, bugler from (C)1917? Public Domain Image
DISCOVERY – January 30th, 2021
If I have learned anything so far in my quest for the historical facts regarding Flight-19, points that really need to be shared, they are the following.
The first, is that there is an inherent risk in accepting whatever you read or hear about the story of Flight-19 at face value, no matter what the source. Yes, even official reports and documentation from the era can have misleading and incorrect information. Albeit it is often seems informed and sometimes contains expert opinion – a few sources even have corroborating documentation- and we do have to be pramatic and start somewhere right? Just keep in mind much of it has never been vetted and until it is, it is at best unfortunately nothing but circumstantial evidence based on hearsay.
“For as I believe any Historian will tell you, memories fade over time, people make mistakes, and there is always the opportunity for bias in retelling history.”
The uncertainty of even basic information, which we would normally consider as being trustworthy concerning everything from plane nomenclature, fuel capacity, equipment and maintenance work before the flight, to reports of sightings of survivors during the search and rescue should only be considered tentative facts until they are validated technically through examination of manuals or review of corroborating evidence and testimony.
I must admit that I was naïve in my belief that I could rely on the veracity of even the formal sources in the first place. Having been in the military myself I should have known better. I have seen my share of pencil whipped maintenance paperwork being submitted as authoritative documentation for one reason or another.
My second illumination, is that for the time being the legend of the Flight-19 disappearance and the Bermuda Triangle enigma are, for better or for worse, seemingly forever intertwined. I believe it’s fair to say that Flight-19 stays current in super natural lore simply because of it’s association with the Bermuda Triangle. If there were no triangle then the allure of the Flight-19 story would likely have faded into history years ago.
Conversely, it makes one wonder if the reverse were true: that if there was no Flight-19, would the luster of the Bermuda Triangle still exist? When’s the last time you heard of a ship or plane dissapearing? Whatever the case we must rely on the available evidence to find the facts to lead us forward in any working theory on either topic.
Unfortunately, until someone finds long lost documentation in the National archives or in someone’s basement, or the US Navy comes forward with some new information regarding its knowledge of events since 1945, or someone defnitively finds the planes, any speculative theory may never be proven.
A final piece of insight.
Anyone taking this research seriously needs to be forewarned of the specter that loiters in the background of even the most legitimate and seriously open minded Flight-19 research. I hesitate to call it conspiracy, but one might begin to ruminate about the possibility of subterfuge or duplicity on the part of the US Navy and perhaps the government itself. It’s an inferred correlation, speculative at best, but one that deserves some consideration just the same. There just seems to be too much coincidence regarding naval involvement and possible interferrence to ignore.
We will examine this invisible intrigue in a future blog.
It’s a little noticed Flight-19 detail, but according to the U.S. Navy, (Image #1), there were two different models of TBM Avengers flying Navigational Hop-1 that day in 1945. Four of the planes were shown to be TBM-1C’s , and the fifth, FT-28, was a TBM-3. As an amateur Flight-19 historian, I had overlooked and made little note of this information until just recently when I noted what appeared to be a discrepancy in the book Discovery of Flight-19 by Jon Myhre. Myhre a much respected Flight-19 researcher and author claimed that FT-28 was a TBM-3D not a TBM-3.
I was comforted knowing that I was not alone in my ignorance to the plane differences. For years this obtuse distinction between Flight-19 aircraft has understandably by and large gone unacknowledged by the general public. To the untrained eye, the aircraft look the same. If you weren’t aware that there were different TBM variants, you wouldn’t be looking for them.
This confusion regarding characteristic variations in aircraft over time has been further compounded by the erroneous photographs found in, books, newspapers, magazines, TV shows and movies. These images have been unintentionally misleading the general public into believing that not only were all the aircraft the same but that there are existing photographs of the planes and crews together.
To investigate and prove or disprove these assertions, my wife and I went to the NAS Ft. Lauderdale museum, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida on a research vacation. What we didn’t expect to find in our inquiry was the lack of attributed photographic evidence and documentation found in the museums collection. Still despite the seemingly lacking material provenance we remained undaunted in our search.
(Image#1)Accident-report-Flight-19-pilot-Taylor-1. Bureau Number (BuNu) #23037 Official Navy Document provided by the NAS Ft. Lauderdale Museum
Not long after starting our investigation however perhaps the most familiar photograph of the plane famously known as FT-28 and most commonly associated with Flight-19 (Photo# 1) was made known to us by the director of the museum John Bloom. Before we could get our hopes up, we were informed that it was not the plane leading the “Lost Patrol”.
According to Bloom the credit for this discovery should be attributed to the founder of the NAS Fort Lauderdale Historical Association – Allan F. McElhiney (now deceased). I asked John how McElhiney, (a driving force behind the museums creation), knew it wasn’t the same plane? He was unsure how to respond and unable to go into detail ‘ he was just told that (he) McElhiney knew ‘.
So how did McElhiney figure it out? Let’s start with circumstantial evidence.
According to Bloom, ‘At the time of the Flight-19 disappearance there were approximately 180 Avengers, a few SNJ’s and other training planes assigned to NAS Fort Lauderdale ‘ From a practical perspective, because the Navy was re-consolidating and closing other naval aviation training facilities like NAS Miami in the months immediately following the war, it stands to reason that Ft. Lauderdale was a recipient of TBM, perhaps even TBF Avengers to use for training and parts. But this information doesn’t allow us to unequivocally claim that the plane is not FT-28.
(Photo #1) FT-28 (Circa 1943/44) Mistakenly identified as a TBM-3 this is not the plane that led Flight-19! Photo courtesy of the NAS Ft. Lauderdale Museum.
Let’s look further into the photo itself. To reach the same findings as McElhiney, one has to ignore all references to the number 28 in the photograph. After all you will see, it is the center of the mis-perception. We also need to examine a couple of generations of the TBF/TBM Avenger line to make the comparison distinguishing plane variants.
Using TBF/TBM aircraft identification reference materials (1*,2*) (See last page.) and by closely comparing the images, we can see details important in distinguishing the models.
1.) Though it is not visible from the front (Photo #1) the TBM-1 Avenger had a single .50 caliber machine gun built into the nose of the plane mounted up close to the cockpit. It was powered by the 1700 HP Wright R-2600-8 engine which had a single engine scoop air intake built into the upper portion of the engine cowling .
2.) The TBM-1C Avenger kept the engine with the single scoop but added a second machine gun, moving one to each wing root and eliminating the nose mount altogether.
3.) The TBM-3 Avenger kept the machine guns in the wing root but replaced the engine with the 1900 HP Wright R-2600-20, 14 cylinder, air cooled radial engine. Designers evidently felt the added heat required an additional air intake to be added in the lower cowling.
As can be clearly seen in the photo above the second air intake is not present and the two machine gun mounts, one each, are just visible on each wing. We have therefore visually proven the theory put forth by McElhiney that the plane shown is actually a TBM-1C, assigned the tail registration number 28.
So, what difference does that make you may ask? First and most importantly, it proves that the Avenger aircraft numbered 28 pictured is not the plane famously associated with Flight-19 and piloted by Navy Lt. Charles C. Taylor!
In the larger scope of all things Flight-19, it also means that we cannot rely solely on the painted on plane tail registration numbers to identify plane photographs and for that matter wrecks. Though the plane number may be the most focal point in finding and identifying wreckage, an in depth analysis using official documentation, the Bureau Number in conjunction with the examination of the plane structure is the most accurate means of verification. The second set of numbers makes the difference in proving identification.
All of my research thus far has led me to the conclusion that to get a true understanding of the events occurring, December 5th 1945 in Fort Lauderdale Florida, it is imperative for anyone researching Flight-19, that they visit the Naval Air Station Museum. I for one have been wanting to go for ages now, and I am finally getting my chance. Continue reading “NAS Ft. Lauderdale: Where it all began.”
Beware! Flight-19 Depth Perception will blow your mind! Alright, let me qualify that statement. If you are savvy and already familiar with the disappearance of the 1945 flight of missing Navy torpedo bombers than this book will make you re-evaluate and challenge all that you perceive as fact.
Though the author relies mainly on secondary sources in her prose, she deftly, but problematically measures there conclusions against the core piece of evidence available. Using the naval review board report from 1945 she both expounds on and contradicts conventional thought, simultaneously. This juxtaposing of timelines and witness accounts really challenges the reader to keep up.
However: the lack of professional editing and additional use of tertiary online sources like Wikipedia and Google is somewhat worrisome. The online articles often referred to by embedded hyperlinks are not properly cited. And though valid points, the reader is left to wander the article with only a hint of the connection to be made. Furthermore: the author’s style of writing the narrative in conjunction with the bibliography or source page does not fit any standard research model found in a traditionally published book..ie..AP, Chicago…etc.
In summation, as a piece of non-fiction, Flight-19 Depth Perception falls short of being a scholarly piece of writing. But the contents alone make it a book for any seasoned Flight-19 investigator. Certainly, as a refreshing take on an old subject, Michelle Lemburg and her OCD writing- her words not mine; in my opinion is undervalued at double the price and well worth the trouble to read.
The author Steve MacGregor sets out to outline his research into the mystery of the Flight-19 disappearance in a logical manner. He is quite successful at explaining the rudimentary timeline and his theory on the happenstance of both the TBM Avenger aircraft and one of the PBM rescue planes sent to find them.
However, in my humble opinion, the book falls short of being a true work of research for a few different reasons. Among other things, it does not contain an index of referenced materials & terms and therefore the reader cannot reference an alleged fact easily. And though there is a short bibliography it is not written in any set standard writing format such as AP or MLA…etc.
Furthermore; though it is a very succinct and simply detailed account of the event, including the subsequent paradoxes after the search and rescue there are a few elements missing from the timeline that the researcher should be aware of and a couple that I believe were overemphasized.
The reader should know that the author’s work is a short piece of approximately 110 pages and is meant as one volume in a series of writings about true-life mysteries.
To be fair, I skimmed the book in two hours looking for key elements to a well-authored piece and though I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the story, I sincerely suggest using it as a supplementary reading or as an introduction to a more in-depth analysis by most of the authors listed in the bibliography.
Five Sides 2aTriangle 